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Elections-Election Contests in North Carolina
Voting irregularities, fraud and illegal conduct by election officials,
candidates, campaign workers and voters can destroy the foundations of
the electoral system in America. The election of a candidate to a public
office supposedly represents the purest expression of the will of the
participants in a representative political system.' Improprieties jeopar-
dize the integrity of the selection process and destroy public confidence
in the decisions of elected officials.
In a North Carolina survey of election board officials completed in
1971, over forty-one percent of the responding officials indicated they
had encountered instances of election fraud.' A study of election
administration difficulties in several American jurisdictions revealed that
in almost half the districts surveyed litigation was instituted either
during or after the tabulation of the election results by candidates
challenging some aspect of the voting procedure.3 Various difficulties
such as broken voting machines, improper advertising and delayed
results gave rise to charges of fraud, apparently even when none was
involved. 4  The inconvenience caused by long lines and broken ma-
chines seriously impaired the right of many citizens to vote., The
purpose of this Comment is threefold: (1) to describe the North
Carolina statutory scheme to control election irregularities, both the
illegal and the simply accidental; (2) to examine the judicial supervision
of the electoral process; and (3) to suggest areas of needed reform.
1. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and demo-
cratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and me-
ticulously scrutinized.
Id. at 561-62. In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 29-33, 7 How. 1, 29-34 (1849), Daniel
Webster, arguing before the Court, gave one of the clearest and most concise statements
of the theory of the American political system.
2. Letter from Thomas J. Harrelson, N.C. House of Representatives, to John
Mitchell, U.S. Att'y Gen., February 10, 1972, at 3 (discussing a report on election re-
form prepared in 1970 by the Republican legislators in the North Carolina General As-
sembly) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
3. OFFIcE OF FEDERAL ELECTIONs, A STUDY OF ELECTION DIFFICULTIES IN REP-
RESENTATIVE AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS-FINAL REPORT at VII-2 (1973). This study,
which dealt with the general election of November 1972, pointed up numerous legal dif-
ficulties encountered at the local level. In three of the seven jurisdictions studied (Ohio,
Michigan and California) the courts both resolved and created election problems. Id.
4. See generally id. at VI-33 to -47 setting out the numerous problems Detroit,
Michigan faced in the 1972 general election.
5. See id. at VII-4.
ELECTION CONTESTS
I. ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
The State Board of Elections and one hundred county elections
boards are charged with the duty of administering primary and general
elections as well as most municipal and bond elections in North Caroli-
na.6 A few cities operate separate municipal election commissions. The
State Board is composed of five members. No more than three mem-
bers may be affiliated with the same political party.7 The members of
the State Board are appointed by the Governor on May 1 of the year
following a general election. In June, the State Board appoints the
members of each county board to two year terms on the recommenda-
tion of the Democratic and Republican State Executive Committees.9
The county boards consist of three members, no more than two of
whom may be affiliated with the same political party.10
These boards are responsible for conducting registration, arranging
for voting places, counting, canvassing, certifying the winners and hear-
ing claims of irregular election practices or dishonest elections. 1 In
performing the latter function, they constitute essentially an administra-
tive trier of fact with judicial powers.' 2 Generally, the administrative
review procedures provided through the various boards of elections must
be utilized before any access to the courts is allowed.' 3 Consequently,
the boards of elections bear the prime responsibility for resolving voting
disputes.
l1. ADMINISTRATIVE CANVASS AND CONTEST PROCEEDINGS
The canvassing responsibility placed on the county and state
boards embodies more than just compiling the precinct results;' 4 the
process is quasi-judicial in nature and requires an examination of the
accuracy and legitimacy of the precinct results as well as a consolidation
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-22, -33 (1976).
7. Id. § 163-19.
8. Id.
9. Id. § 163-30.
10. Id.
11. Id. § 163-33.
12. See Bell v. County Bd. of Elections, 188 N.C. 311, 124 S.E. 311 (1924). See
also note 15 & text accompanying notes 67-70 infra.
13. Garner v. Town of Newport, 246 N.C. 449, 98 S.E.2d 505 (1957); Ledwell
v. Proctor, 221 N.C. 161, 19 S.E.2d 234 (1942). There are, however, instances in
which an aggrieved party may bypass the administrative review process. See text accom-
panying note 25 infra.
14. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-175 (1976).
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of these returns into countywide (or, for the State Board, statewide)
election results. 15
A candidate protesting the results of an election must present his
grievances to the appropriate elections board under the procedures
spelled out by the State Board in the North Carolina Administrative
Code, Title 8, Chapter 2.16 A hearing must be conducted at which the
board makes findings of fact and conclusions of law.17  An aggrieved
party has a right of appeal to the State Board from any county board.
From an adverse ruling of the State Board a contestant may seek review
in the Superior Court of Wake County in a multidistrict or statewide
race or, in a county race, in the superior court of the county where the
contest arose.18 A certificate of election, if not already issued, will be
withheld during the pendency of a contest. 19
15. Prior to the beginning of this century, a separate board of canvassers met in
each county to perform the function of examining and tabulating county totals. At first
the county commissioners performed this function and Law of February 10, 1872, ch.
185, § 19, 1871-72 N.C. Laws 298 (formerly codified as PUBLc STAT. oF N.C. ch.
52, § 21 (W. Battle rev. 1873)) required them to "proceed to add the number of votes
returned. . . . the person having the greatest number of votes [to be] deemed duly
elected." Subsequently, a separate body of canvassers, usually the justices of the peace,
canvassed the returns and judicially determined the results under the authority of Law
of March 12, 1877, ch. 275, § 25, 1876-77 N.C. Laws 525 (formerly codified as N.C.
CODE § 2694 (1883)), which directed them to "open and canvass, and judicially deter-
mine the returns." In Peebles v. Commissioners of Davie County, 82 N.C. 385 (1880),
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the "judicially determine" language meant
that the board had a limited duty to look at the authenticity of the totals. The court
refused to sanction an inquiry into the composition of the aggregate vote. By 1919, tho
statute was changed to provide that "the [board of county canvassers] shall have power
and authority to judicially pass upon all facts relative to the election, and judicially de-
termine and declare the result of the same." Law of March 14, 1901, ch. 89, § 33,
1901 N.C. Pub. Laws 256 (formerly codified as N.C. CoNs. STAT. § 5986 (1919)).
As part of its judicial powers, the board was also granted the authority to examine
both documents and witnesses. Today the County Board of Elections, with its presumed
expertise in election matters, doubles as a board of canvassers when it performs that
function two days after each election. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-175 (1976) now declares:
[Tuhe county board of elections shall have power and authority to judicially
pass upon all facts relative to the primary or election, to make or order such
recounts as it deems necessary, and to judicially determine the result of the pri-
mary or election. The board shall also have power to send for papers and per-
sons and to examine them, and to pass upon the legality of any disputed ballots
transmitted to it by any precinct election official.
Additionally, the county boards are constituted inferior courts by id. § 163-34 fox
the purpose of maintaining order and enforcing its directives. This latter statute allows
the county chairman to commit an offender to jail for up to 30 days on his written
order. The charged person may have an immediate appeal to superior court by posting
bond. In summary, the county boards have become essentially administrative tribunals
with significant judicial powers when constituted as canvassers and engaged in examining
charges of election irregularity.
16. N.C. ADMiN. CODE tit. 8, chs. 2-0001-.0009 (1976).
17. Id. ch. 2.0005.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.26 (1976) governs statewide and multicounty dis.
trict offices; id. § 163-11 (b) deals with county races and statewide primaries.
19. Id. § 163-181(a).
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A candidate or elector must protest an election irregularity in
writing to the county board on or before the canvass date.20  Chapter
2.0001 allows the county board to resolve the controversy during the
canvass itself or at a later time. In order to be entitled to a recount after
the canvass, the candidate must allege either errors in the tabulation of
the votes or the counting of a sufficient number of illegal votes to
change the results of the election. 2 The error-in-tabulation ground for
a recount can be misleading in that the inclusion of any illegal votes
results in an error in tabulation and, interpreting the requirements
literally, the error-in-tabulation allegation need not further allege that
the result of the election would be affected thereby. The remedy for the
exclusion of valid votes is a recount based on the allegation of an error
in tabulation. Unqualified voters must be identified by name and a
specific cause for alleged disqualification must be assigned.22 The
county board must then hear the charges publicly and rule on them. It
may call and subpoena witnesses or take evidence by affidavit or other-
wise, amend its canvassing returns, order a recount or, with approval of
the State Board, order a new election.23
On appeal to the State Board, that body has the power to hear the
case on petition, hear it de novo or remand it to the county board for
additional action. 24 Only after final action by the State Board may the
contestant go into court. There are, however, two exceptions to this
exhaustion requirement. When a voter is appealing a. denial of registra-
tion under North Carolina General Statutes section 163-77, or when a
primary candidate is contesting a result under North Carolina General
Statutes section 163-181(b), the contestant is allowed to bypass the
county and state boards and go directly to superior court.25  This latter
short-cut seems contrary to the main thrust of the administrative process
and is virtually unused by primary candidates. 26 The apparent ration-
ale behind this direct review provision is to take party affiliation deci-
sions out of the partisan hands of the county boards. As a practical
matter, the elections boards hear all protests whether they involve pri-
mary, special or general elections.2 7
20. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, ch. 2.0001 (1976).
21. Id.
22. Id. ch. 2.0002.
23. Id. chs. 2.0004-.0005; see note 15 and text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
24. N.C. ADmN. CODE tit. 8, chs. 2.0006-.0007 (1976). The statutory authority
for the promulgation of these regulations is found in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-22, -22.1
(1976).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-77, -181(b) (1976).
26. No direct appeal cases have been discovered by the author.
27. Research has failed to elicit any case where this short-cut method was used;
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Although a court cannot directly order a new election under any
circumstances, it can void the results of a contested election and thus
force a new election. 28  The State Elections Board, on the other hand,
may order a new election, upon the affirmative vote of four members
after public hearings, for "election contests, alleged election irregulari-
ties or fraud, or violations of election laws. ' '20  This flexibility is the
chief advantage of the administrative process.
IlH. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The requirements for standing to challenge an election result are
fairly lenient. While cases have indicated that only an aggrieved candi-
date had standing to challenge the result,30 the law seems to be that
anyone who alleges that he voted for a candidate who should have been
elected may bring suit.3 When dealing with constitutional, municipal
charter or bond referenda, apparently anyone who alleges that he voted
or was denied an opportunity to vote has an interest in the result
sufficient to support litigation.32 The standing of one who is merely an
affected resident and not a registered voter is an open question; but, if
he has a financial interest as a taxpayer, it seems reasonable that he has
an interest in the election. 33  A non-resident should not be able to
challenge a purely local result.34
Because election results are important for the orderly transition of
power, the results of balloting as determined by the administrative
agency are not to be overturned lightly by the courts. Certified
election results enjoy a high presumption of validity for a variety of
however, numerous cases of county board rulings on primary election irregularities exist
even after passage of this statute. See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON ELECTIONS AND
VOTING ABusEs IN NORTH CAROLINA (February 16, 1973), reprinted in 39 POPULAR
Gov'T 26-27 (May 1973).
28. Tucker v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 240 N.C. 177, 81 S.E.2d 399 (1954);
see text accompanying notes 106-109 inlra.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-22.1 (1976).
30. E.g., Freeman v. Board of County Comm'r, 217 N.C. 209, 7 S.E.2d 354
(1940).
31. It is not required that a relator be a contestant for public office to challengo
the result because any qualified voter and taxpayer has a direct interest in having the
office occupied only by the person entitled to it. State ex rel. Associated Cosmetologists
v. Ritchie, 206 N.C. 808, 175 S.E. 308 (1934) (dictum).
32. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 1306-36 (1957).
33. See State ex rel. Barlow v. Benfield, 231 N.C. 663, 58 S.E.2d 637 (1950).
34. One who is neither ar esident nor a candidate will have no interest in an elec-
tion other than an academic one. He should not be able to intervene in purely local
affairs. Cf. Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 205, 281 S.W. 837 (1926) (interest of member of
general public inadequate).
35. See Collins v. Emerson, 236 N.C. 297, 72 S.E.2d 685 (1952).
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reasons. First, close supervision of the legislative, executive and judicial
elections can thwart the separation of powers doctrine.16  Secondly,
since the transition of official power from hand to hand necessarily
entails public uncertainity, unrest and significant public cost, society
should not be subjected to this turmoil too often. Finally, the entire
problem of supervising elections is a detailed process best left in the
hands of those with expertise in the area-an administrative agency.3 7
For these reasons, and simply out of a reluctance to try to referee
political quarrels, the courts have very infrequently overturned duly
certified election results.
At common law, the courts allowed a quo warranto proceeding-a
high prerogative writ of inquiry instituted as a challenge to the authority
lying behind the actions of a public official.3" In theory, a private
citizen, acting in the interest and on the relation of the state, sought to
try title to an office held by another by looking at the validity of his
certificate of election. 9 As an alternative common law remedy, an
unsuccessful contestant could bring a writ of mandamus to force an
official body, normally a board of canvassers, to perform the ministerial
duty of certifying him as the proper winner.4" Early decisions of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina contained considerable discussion of
the relative appropriateness of one remedy versus another.41 Today
the distinction is inconsequential, although the proceeding that emerged
is derived from the writ of quo warranto. The modern action to try title
to public office is allowed under North Carolina General Statutes sec-
tions 1-514 to 1-532.12 The action is on the relation of the state and
36. For a brief statement of the principle, see, e.g., Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 835-36 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem., 495 F.2d 1075
(D.C. Cir. 1972) rev'd sub nom. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208 (1974).
37. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
38. See G. MCCRARY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS § 393,
at 294 (4th ed. 1897) [hereinafter cited as MCCRARY]. The McCrary treatise, first pub-
lished in 1875, is still the leading authority on the substantive law of election contests.
Judge McCrary, who chaired the House Committee on Elections at the federal level for
many years in the 1880s, compiled a very complete but, in many areas, outdated work.
Legal scholarship would be greatly advanced by an updated work.
39. Harkrader v. Lawrence, 190 N.C. 441, 130 S.E. 35 (1925).
40. McCRARY, supra note 38, § 385, at 290.
41. Rhodes v. Love, 153 N.C. 468, 69 S.E. 436 (1910); Lyon v. Board of
Comm'rs, 120 N.C. 237, 26 S.E. 929 (1897); McCARY, supra note 38, §§ 397-400, at
295-98.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-514 to -532 (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1975). The writs of
scire facias and quo warranto are abolished. However, the civil suit replacing them is
conducted like an action to try title to property. See, e.g., State ex rel. Freeman v. Pon-
der, 234 N.C. 294, 67 S.E.2d 292 (1951); Cozart v. Fleming, 123 N.C. 547, 31 S.E.
822 (1898).
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certain statutory formalities must be observed including the posting of a
bond in sufficient amount to secure the state from any expense. 48
The authority of an elected official cannot be challenged in a
collateral suit.44 Thus, a criminal defendant may not claim his convic-
tion was invalid due to an improperly elected judge or his arrest was
tortious due to a holdover sheriff, provided that these officials act under
color of a duly issued certificate of office.4' To allow such collateral
attacks would unnecessarily complicate the legal process and render the
statutory electoral challenge process meaningless. On such policy
grounds the certificate of election is held inviolate. The elections
boards and the courts deal with election irregularities in a proceeding
directly and exclusively aimed at eliciting the "true" results of the
balloting.46
A. Burden of Proof
Because of the presumed validity of a challenged election, the
judicial burden of persuasion in any proceeding is an extremely difficult
one to meet. Election results will not be disturbed for irregularities
that are insufficient to affect the result.47  The necessary showing
of irregularity to justify relief has been characterized in two different
ways. Most North Carolina cases require that the aggrieved party
show that sufficient illegal votes cast for the declared winner were
counted or that sufficient legal votes cast for a loser were excluded
to have changed the result of the election in controversy. 48 In effect,
someone other than the declared winner must be shown to have re-
ceived a plurality of the votes.49 If a candidate shows only that more
illegal votes were cast than votes separating him from the winner, he
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-517 (1969); State ex rel. Cooper v. Crisco, 201 N.C. 739,
742, 161 S.E. 310, 312 (1931); Midgett v. Gray, 158 N.C. 133, 135, 73 S.E. 791, 791
(1912).
44. Collins v. Emerson, 236 N.C. 297, 72 S.E.2d 685 (1952).
45. See, e.g., English v. Brigman, 225 N.C. 402, 404, 35 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1945).
46. McCRARY, supra note 38, §§ 415-416, at 305-06.
47. Gardner v. City of Reidsville, 269 N.C. 581, 585, 153 S.E.2d 139, 144 (1967);
State ex rel. Owens v. Chaplin, 228 N.C. 705, 47 S.E.2d 12 (1948); State ex rel. Cohoon
v. Swain, 216 N.C. 317, 5 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
48. Starbuck v. Town of Havelock, 255 N.C. 198, 120 S.E.2d 440 (1961); De-
loatch v. Rogers, 86 N.C. 358 (1882).
49. State ex rel. Phillips v. Slaughter, 209 N.C. 543, 183 S.E. 897 (1936). The
official count for the mayor's race was 81 to 68. Plaintiff alleged various counts of
election fraud which, if true, would have changed the count to 73 to 69. Since the
fraud would not affect the outcome, the court could offer no relief.
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cannot get judicial relief under the majority rule. He would also have
to show that those illegal votes were all cast for his opponent and none
for himself. However, Judge McCrary, the leading commentator in the
area, suggest that a more meaningful standard would require the
contestant to show merely that due to illegalities or voting irregularities,
the true outcome of the election cannot be ascertained. 50 The elections
board rules seem to adopt the more lenient standard. 51 Mere allega-
tions that illegal votes were cast would not be enough in any event.5 2
As a further complication, relief may be denied even under the
more lenient standard because of the manner in which improper votes
may be presumed to affect the vote totals of the respective candidates.
When a party can show that the number of improper votes exceeds the
difference between the final vote totals of the candidates, a court has two
options in determining if the result might be affected: it might deduct
all the illegal votes from the person having the majority or it might
deduct the number of improper ballots pro rata from both candidates,
thereby leaving the result unchanged. According to McCrary, a court,
having no power to declare a new election, should always apply the pro
rata rule in the absence of specific evidence about the direction of the
illegal votes, while an administrative body should avoid the problem by
declaring a new election.53  It will not be judicially presumed that all
the illegal votes were cast for one candidate. Of course, neither is it
logical that all candidates would be equal participants in the irregulari-
ties. McCrary's rule is probably the optimal solution-the policy
should lean toward a new election if the administrative body finds real
evidence of fraud or illegality since it is closer to the actual balloting
process and is the appropriate authority to conduct a new election.
Although it is arguable that evidence of corrupt practices by elec-
tions board officials should suffice to invalidate the results of the ballot-
ing by itself, the North Carolina courts apply a standard that provides
that the misconduct of election officials will not vitiate an election unless
the results were affected thereby.54 Indeed, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has gone further and announced that
honest mistake[s] or mere omissions on the part of the election
officers, or irregularities in directory matters, even though gross,
50. McCRARY, supra note 38, § 396, at 295.
51. N.C. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 8, ch. 2.0001 (1976); see text accompanying note 21
supra.
52. Starbuck v. Town of Havelock, -255 N.C. 198, 120 S.E.2d 440 (1961).
53. See McCRARY, supra note 38, § 496, at 365-66.
5,4. Plott v. Board of Comm'rs, 187 N.C. 125, 131, 121 S.E. 190, 193 (1924).
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if not fraudulent, will not avoid an election, unless they affect the
result, or at least render it uncertain. But if the irregularities
are so great that the election is not conducted in accordance with
law, either in form or substance, [and] there are matters of sub-
stance [that] render the result uncertain, or where they are fraud-
ulent and the result is made doubtful thereby, the returns should
be set aside.-5
In Penland v. Bryson City,56 the state supreme court suggested that if
election officials are involved in the election irregularity, the standard of
proof ought to be less stringent.57 This is a logical conclusion since if
election officials are parties to the misconduct, proof of the "true
results" may be impossible to obtain.68
While an attack on the ballot totals themselves constitutes the most
common electoral challenge, some elections have been overturned and
the results voided when it was determined that no valid votes were cast
or that the election was so fraught with illegality that the results were
meaningless.Y9 Challenges on these grounds have not been favored in
the North Carolina courts60 and have been virtually ignored by the
boards of elections. However, if the election officials are themselves
corrupt and simply alter the actual votes cast, there will be little direct
evidence of fraud or irregularity. In this situation the introduction of
compelling circumstantial evidence to show the complete failure of the
electoral process should be held sufficient to support judicial relief. This
would provide a needed complement to the more typical procedure for
contest. The necessity for such an alternative method of proof was part
of the rationale behind the Voting Rights Act of 1965.01 Congress felt
that discrimination in registration was so endemic to the system that
only federal control and supervision could put an end to it."2 Without
an alternative ground for relief that does not require a direct showing of
55. Hill v. Skinner, 169 N.C. 405, 412, 86 S.E. 351, 354-55 (1915) (quoting 10
AM. & ENG. ENc. OF LAw 766-67 (2d ed. 1899) (bracketed changes are the court's))
(the lenient standard of proof).
56. 199 N.C. 140, 154 S.E. 88 (1930).
57. Id. at 148, 154 S.E. at 92.
58. The courts often confuse this analysis with the substantive versus directory
issue, discussed at text accompanying notes 75-81 infra. E.g., Smith v. City of Wilming-
ton, 98 N.C. 343, 4 S.E. 489 (1887).
59. Tucker v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 240 N.C. 177, 81 S.E.2d 349
(1954); Corey v. Hardison, 236 N.C. 147, 72 S.E.2d 416 (1952); Rodwell v. Harrison,
132 N.C. 45, 43 S.E. 540 (1903); State ex rel. Van Amringe v. Taylor, 108 N.C. 196,
12 S.E. 1005 (1891); Perry v. Whitaker, 71 N.C. 477 (1874).
60. See Rider v. Lenoir County, 236 N.C. 620, 629, 73 S.E.2d 913, 920 (1953).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74 (1970).
62. When the Attorney General finds an affected state practicing registration dis-
crimination, he is empowered to appoint federal observers to go into the non-complying
1236 [Vol. 55
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the correct results, such "intrinsic" election fraud would not be revealed
in a contest.
B. Evidence
The harshness of the changed outcome rule and the pro rata
assumption underscore the importance of determining which candi-
date benefitted from the illegal votes cast. Generally, no special marks
or identifying numbers are allowed on ballots to enable them to be
traced to the voter.63 If the voter who cast an illegal vote is allowed
to testify for whom he voted, a golden opportunity for further fraud
exists because the corrupt voter might well identify the opposing candi-
date as his pick and, if believed, the victimized candidate would be
victimized again-the illegal vote would be counted twice. 64 For this
reason, some commentators have argued that no voter should be allowed
to testify about his vote. 5 Nevertheless, the general rule is that once a
specific voter's lack of qualification is shown, he may testify as to how he
voted and his credibility is a matter for the jury.6
The problem of admitting into evidence the testimony of a fraudu-
lent voter has been somewhat relieved by the challenge and absentee
voter procedures. If a voter is challenged by a poll watcher on election
day the dispute is immediately heard by the registrar and judges before
the challenged voter is allowed to cast his ballot.67  Absentee ballots in
North Carolina are received in numbered containers and the qualifica-
tions of the voter are passed on before his vote is opened and counted. 68
If it is alleged that some of the ballots are improper it is easy to prove for
whom these votes were cast. Because of this ease of identification,
absentee and challenged voters are commonly alleged by contestants to
be irregular in order to facilitate proof at the hearing.69 Nevertheless, if
it is not known for whom an illegal voter voted, his testimony is properly
admitted on that point.70 Evidence of partisan affiliation and activities
precincts and actually register minority voters if necessary. rd. § 1973(d).
63. Baxter v. Ellis, 111 N.C. 124, 15 S.E. 938 (1892); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-
170(5) (1976).
64. McCRARY, supra note 38, § 485, at 356.
65. E.g., id. § 491, at 362.
66. See, e.g., Thompson v. Cihak, 254 Mich. 641, 236 N.W. 893 (1931); Gallegos
v. Miera, 28 N.M. 565, 215 P. 968 (1923).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-88 (1976).
68. Id. § 163-89.
69. At least in successful contests. See Overton v. Mayor of Hendersonville, 253
N.C. 306, 116 S.E.2d 808 (1960); Baxter v. Ellis, 111 N.C. 124, 15 S.E. 938 (1892).
70. See McCRARY, supra note 38, § 495, at 364-65.
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may be admissible for impeachment purposes.71  In most cases the
actual ballots and tally sheets are admissible.7 2 They may be better
evidence of an altered vote total than the testimony of the voter.
IV. TYPES OF IRREGULARITIES AND ILLEGALITIES
Within this procedural framework the system must adjudicate
claims of election irregularities. An irregularity can be placed within
one of four categories depending on the point in the process at which it
allegedly occurred. First, irregularities may occur before any election
(primary, special or general) in the registration process or in the official
method of notifying the public of the election time or place.78 Also, the
candidates may violate campaign finance laws or filing requirements. 4
Pre-election violations will usually result in reduced opportunities for
legal votes to be cast. In these situations, the courts must confront the
additional question whether the regulation violated is "merely directory"
or is a matter of "substance" requiring the overturning of the election
results. 5 While the question is bound up in the determination of
whether such illegalities actually influenced the results of the elec-
tion, there is another dimension to the problem. A court that finds an
election void has in effect ordered a new election by vacating the office
filled or nullifying the action taken as a result of the election. The theory
is akin to the idea of "infectious invalidity" through fraud on the part
of the election conductors.76
Certain violations of election regulations have been held not to be
substantive; for instance, if a registrar is improperly qualified, sworn or
maintains improper hours of registration, the votes cast by the voters he
registers will still count77 unless there was no chance to register at all.78
71. See People ex rel. Boyer v. Teague, 106 N.C. 576, 11 S.E. 665 (1890).
72. State ex rel. Freeman v. Ponder, 234 N.C. 294, 67 S.E.2d 292 (1951).
73. See, e.g., Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 797 (1972); Annot., 121 A.L.R. 987 (1939).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.6 to .35 (1976); see Fleishman, Public Financing
of Election Campaigns: Constitutional Constraints on Steps Toward Equality of Politi.
cal Influence of Citizens, 52 N.C.L. REv. 349 (1974). While these violations may give
rise to criminal prosecutions, there are no provisions calling for overturning the results
of an election on the basis of illegal spending. Thus, if some candidate wished to "buy"
an office with the accompanying risk of prosecution, there is no procedure to revoke
that tainted office short of impeachment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.27 (1976).
75. McCnRY, supra note 38, §§ 225-229, at 168-73.
76. See, eg., In re Contest of Election of Vetsch, 245 Minn. 229, 71 N.W.2d 652
(1955).
77. McPherson v. City of Burlington, 249 N.C. 569, 107 S.E.2d 147 (1959); Glenn
v. Culbreth, 197 N.C. 675, 150 S.E. 332 (1929); Plott v. Board of Comm'rs, 187 N.C.
125, 121 S.E. 190 (1924); Davis v. County Board of Educ., 186 N.C. 227, 119 S.E.
372 (1923); State ex rel. Quinn v. Lattimore, 120 N.C. 426, 26 S.E. 638 (1897).
78. Perry v. Whitaker, 71 N.C. 475 (1874).
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Similarly, if the polling place is moved without formally correct notice79
or there are accusations of ineffectual intimidation,"0 the election result
will not be disturbed absent proof that critical numbers of voters who
wished to cast their ballots were kept from doing so by the activity."'
North Carolina courts and the elections boards have been hesitant
to enjoin an election on the basis of pre-election irregularities.8 2  Nor-
mally the irregularity surfaces too late to be resolved before the election
proper. Consequently, the question becomes whether the pre-election
misconduct has affected the results of the election. Evidence showing
such an effect is usually either speculative or unobtainable and therefore
insufficient. From a policy standpoint, it would seem appropriate for
the tainted election to be rescheduled. Just as National Labor Relations
Board elections not conducted under "laboratory conditions" are held
void,83 so tainted elections generally should be cleansed when neces-
sary. Unfortunately, this action is rarely taken in North Carolina.
The next category of irregularities are those that occur during the
balloting process. Such schemes as chain balloting,84 manipulating
voting machines, defacing proper ballots, 85 having partisan "helpers"
mark ballots,86 fixing the beginning tally of voting machines87 and
outright physical intimidation are all too common in precincts accus-
tomed to corrupt politics. The result may be the inclusion of illegal
votes as well as the exclusion of legal votes. In order to prevent the
occurrence of such problems, poll watchers, two judges and a registrar
79. Town of Hendersonville v. Jordan, 150 N.C. 35, 63 S.E. 167 (1908).
80. Roberts v. Calvert, 98 N.C. 580, 4 S.E. 127 (1887).
81. Deloatch v. Rogers, 86 N.C. 357 (1882).
82. The North Carolina courts have never enjoined the conduct of an election.
The primary reason would seem to be that such an extraordinary remedy demands a
showing of irreparable harm that is usually impossible to demonstrate until the election
results are tabulated.
83. See, e.g., General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
84. The violator acquires an unmarked ballot. He then marks it and gives it to
a voter who gets a fresh ballot, secrets it, deposits the marked ballot in the box and
then returns the fresh ballot to the violator for his payment. The process is then re-
peated with other voters. See State v. Abernathy, 220 N.C. 226, 17 S.E.2d 25 (1941).
85. The traditional defacing scheme involves the participation of a judge or coun-
ter who normally places votes in the proper ballot boxes. He has a pencil lead inserted
under his fingernail and marks in the appropriate party circle on each ballot as he depos-
its it in the box. Under the counting rules of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-170 (1976), the
ballots will all be counted as either a straight ticket vote or a spoiled ballot.
86. For many years the presence of large numbers of illiterate voters allowed a
party to garner numerous votes by furnishing interested "helpers" when needed in each
precinct.
87. A voting machine is advanced numerous times before the polls open and the
figures taped over with zeros for the opening count. The names of deceased persons
and absentees are then used to balance the poll books.
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are stationed at the polls. 8  The involvement of these officials in illegal
activity may be hard to discover and harder to prove.8"
Election day irregularities are difficult to remedy. The ability of a
court or an elections board to correct such an irregularity depends on
ease of communication and swiftness of action. Ordinarily, no official
action is taken until the irregularity emerges at canvass. Some method
should exist for isolating the tainted precinct and remedying the effects
of corruption. Courts in other jurisdictions regularly enter numerous
orders during the polling period requiring extended hours or changes in
location.0 The elections board also needs stronger tools to effect
immediate changes when tampering is discovered during balloting. At
a minimum, they should have the authority to remove summarily all
election officials and replace them with others.91 Ideally, they should
be able to alter polling hours and other details of administration, as well
as to order a new election in the affected precinct immediately. The en-
tire canvassing and certification process should be delayed until the re-
vised results are obtained. 2 Presently, the elections boards' authority is
restricted to keeping order on election day. 8 The courts usually do not
get involved until after the fact. Occasionally a court may intervene and
extend polling time in a crisis situation. The judicial system, however,
is too slow to supervise the polls on election day. Mechanical failures of
voting machines may distort the results so much as to render them
indeterminable. Problems with the hours or location of the polls 4 may
surface during the course of balloting. Only immediate intervention
can remedy the situation.
The poll challenge process formerly caused many problems on
election day. 5 Courts were occasionally pressed into service to rule
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-41, -45 (1976).
89. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
90. See OFFICE OF FEDEnAL ELECnoNS, supra note 3, at VII-3.
91. The State Board, and by implication the county boards, have a duty to investi-
gate fraud by election officials. See Ponder v. Joslin, 262 N.C. 496, 138 S.E.2d 143
(1964). A precinct official, however, can only be removed before the end of his tenure
by criminal conviction for an election law violation under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-276
(1976).
92. The purpose is to avoid tainting the results in the affected precinct by sealing
off the final count from other precincts. Of course, secrecy of precinct results would
be difficult to enforce.
93. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-34 (1976).
94. See Town of Hendersonville v. Jordan, 150 N.C. 35, 63 S.E. 167 (1908).
95. The cumbersome procedure of convening a panel to hear the challenge and tak-
ing evidence gave some precinct manipulators a chance to mire down the election proc-
ess while other frauds were under way.
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whether a certain person could legally vote before the polls closed. Now
the assigned judge and registrars will hear the challenge immediately.""
If the challenge is sustained, the barred voter has a right of appeal to
the superior court.97 If the challenge is rejected, the voter may proceed
to vote.
Probably the largest category of alleged illegalities are those occur-
ring during the counting and canvassing of the votes. 98 These problems
during the post-election tabulation process most often relate either to the
results of incidents that occurred during balloting or to illegal activities
by the vote counters or precinct personnel. A detailed procedure for
opening ballot boxes is provided by statute.9" The statutes also set out
rules for deciding when ballots are spoiled and when a straight ticket
vote overrides inconsistent vote-splitting. 10 The judges and registrars
are responsible for making judgments on whether a ballot is proper or
spoiled.10 They must also ensure that all ballots are preserved for
possible recounts. 0 2
The tabulation totals are probative evidence in a tabulation error
contest.'0 3 These figures, compiled on election night, may be presumed
to be more accurate than the certifications made several days later.
Discrepancies between precinct tally sheets and canvass totals are gener-
ally resolved in favor of the tally sheets.'04 Furthermore, the courts
could utilize the tally sheets as grounds for altering an election on the
theory that they are requiring the elections board to make its certifica-
tion conform with the "true results" regardless of the canvassing
process.' 05
In general, a court will not reform the vote totals by ordering that
an uncast vote be counted unless it is clear that a specific voter actually
appeared at the polls, offered to cast his vote and was prevented from
doing so without fault of his own and after the exercise of due dili-
gence.' 06 Mere speculation that many voters were unable to vote does
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-88 (1976).
97. Id. § 163-77.
98. This stage presents the greatest opportunity for illegal actions that directly af-
fect the outcome. As Will Rogers once said-more elections have been won from dusk
to dawn than have ever been decided from dawn to dusk.
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-169 (1976).
100. Id. § 163-170.
101. Id. § 163-169(g).
102. Id. § 163-171.
103. State ex rel. Freeman v. Ponder, 234 N.C. 294, 67 S.E.2d 292 (1951).
104. See id. at 305-06, 67 S.E.2d 301-02.
105. McCRAY, supra note 38, § 412, at 303.
106. Id. H9 527-527b, at 384-86.
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not establish sufficient grounds for challenge.10 7 On the other hand, if
the election was held without any statutory authority or if a large
number of the legal residents had no opportunity to register or vote,
then the election is voided regardless of whether it can be shown the
result would have been different.' 08 In the more common case such
irregularities affect only a limited number of votes. The inquiry in such
cases is directed toward the strict standard of proof-would the outcome
have been different if the illegal votes had not been cast or the legal
votes not excluded.' 0 9
A final category of possible violations relates to the basic authority
to conduct the election or the legal qualifications of the candidate. Such
activities as forming new parties" or printing fair ballots"' would fall
within this general set of "iolations. Generally, such irregularities do
not result in the invalidity of the result declared by the canvass.
Occasionally an elections board has been faced with a case where a
candidate becomes ineligible for some reason, withdraws from the race
or dies before the balloting." 2  There is a statutory procedure for
appointing a stand-in candidate under some circumstances,1 3 but nor-
mally the elections board must resolve the issue on an ad hoc basis. If
the ballots have been printed the election may be allowed to continue
with a new candidate receiving all the votes attributed to the ineligible
name."14 Alternatively, the board may require that the ballots be
reprinted or the election delayed to insure fairness." 86 A reviewing
court will evaluate the elections board's decision on the grounds of
fairness to the candidates and proper opportunity for the electorate to
express its true wishes." 0 Few guidelines can be established beyond an
examination of all the circumstances and the effect of the irregularity.
107. Rider v. Lenoir County, 236 N.C. 620, 73 S.E.2d 913 (1953).
108. Tucker v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 240 N.C. 177, 81 S.E.2d 399 (1954).
109. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
110. See States' Rights Democratic Party v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections,
229 N.C. 179, 49 S.E.2d 379 (1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-96 to -98 (1976).
111. See N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 163-135 to -142 (1976).
112. See, e.g., Baker v. Marcum, 216 Ky. 210, 287 S.W. 696 (1926); Black v. Board
of Supervisors of Elections, 232 Md. 74, 191 A.2d 580 (1963).
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-112, -114, -294.1 (1976).
114. Id. § 163-139.
115. Id.
116. See Ponder v. Joslin, 262 N.C. 496, 138 S.E.2d 143 (1964). If the circum-
stances show a fair and free expression of the will of the people, the courts will not
intervene. Burgun v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 214 N.C. 140, 198 S.E.
592 (1938).
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V. REFORM SUGGESTIONS
The statutory and administrative measures developed in North
Carolina to prevent corruption of the electoral process are surprisingly
effective considering that election officials are usually employed only on
a part-time basis and that there may be a great temptation to reap the
rewards of a political office through illegal means. It is safe to say that
the state and local election machinery usually delivers a correct result.
Major problems such as inequitable fund raising and campaign financ-
ing, the use of patronage to win votes and extensive media distortion of
the issues are more often the result of the economic and political system
than of the election machinery itself. There is, however, room for im-
provement both in the statutory mechanics of election conduct and in
the judicial supervision of the administrative system.
A basic conflict exists between the independence and objectivity of
the county and state boards of elections and the political cauldrons from
which their memberships originate. The members of these boards are
part-time officials and are usually old line members of local political
organizations.1 1 7 Appointment to an elections board is the reward for
faithful party precinct service. There is a full-time professional staff
headed by the Executive Secretary-Director at the state level and execu-
tive secretaries at the county level,"1 but these individuals are also
political appointees with a vested interest in partisan policies.",9 Thus,
the bodies in the greatest need of insulation from political tangles are
selected from the most partisan source.
The Commission on Abuses of the Election and Voting Process
filed a report in 1973 asking the North Carolina Legislature to stagger
State Board membership terms and extend county board terms to avoid
wholesale changes in personnel after elections.120 Unfortunately, the
proposal was not enacted. Longer terms with staggered appointments
would aid significantly in depoliticizing the system. The development
of a professional, nonpartisan staff is even more important. The elec-
toral machinery should have no built-in partisan bias nor be subject to
continual pressure from incumbent office-holders. Local party execu-
117. The local party chairman normally recommends his local precinct workers to
elections boards for nomination.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-26, -27, -35 (1976).
119. Note the substantial attempts to freeze these persons in office by altering the
dismissing procedure during the 1972 Republican coup d'6tat in North Carolina. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-27, -35(b) (1976) (as amended in 1973 and 1975).
120. REPORT OF TIE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND VOTING ABUSES IN NORTH
CAROLINA 1 (February 16, 1973), reprinted in 39 POPULAR GOV'T 26 (May 1973).
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tive committees now make recommendations for membership on local
boards. Filling vacancies by executive nomination might well relieve
some of the partisan influences.
Another method of insulating the electoral process from undue
political pressure would be to revoke the jurisdiction of the elections
boards to hear contests of elections. The present system of contest
hearings often requires that an election board rule on the legitimacy of its
own actions. A better method would be to create a new judicial body in
the nature of an administrative law court, manned with professional
administrative hearing examiners, to hear election contests. Appeal
from this body would be to the superior court under the regular process
of judicial supervision of the administrative system.1 2' An added ad-
vantage to the use of administrative law judges is the expertise the
judges can apply to contest proceedings. The cost of maintaining these
officials solely for the purpose of hearing election contests could be
prohibitive. Perhaps a combination of election duties with the hearing
of other administrative appeals would justify the creation of this body.
There are numerous steps that can be taken to protect the balloting
procedure against fraud and tampering. The use of voting machines is
clearly superior to the use of paper ballots, which can be much more
easily altered and destroyed.' 2 2 The complex and often misinterpreted
rules for counting improperly marked ballots123 could be discarded if
voting machines were used. Voters should be secured against intimida-
tion and unfair pressure when they are within the confines of the polling
location. ThE presence of public employees such as policemen, how-
ever, should be minimized. Restrictions on campaigning at the polling
place 124 should be strictly enforced.
The present method of identifying voters is susceptible to corrup-
tion.1 25 All voters should be required to present proof of identity and
residence when voting and registering. Permanent registration cards
should include either a physical description of the voter or a photograph.
Special disabilities such as illiteracy or blindness that establish a need for
ballot marking assistance should be stated and proved on election day
121. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
122. See OFFICE OF FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 3, exhibits a, b, & c.
123. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-170 (1976).
124. Id. § 163-147.
125. Id. § 163-150(a) requires only that a voter "at once state his name and place
of residence . . ."; the judge will "announce the name and residence in a distinct tone
of voice"; and then the registrar "shall state whether the person seeking to vote is duly
registered."
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and, when marking his ballot, the voter should have a choice of helpers
available to him. 12 6 To prevent double voting, the voter should be
required to sign the poll book. These signatures could then be pre-
served as a record of the voting population.
As previously noted, identifying a particular challenged ballot
under the secret ballot system is usually impossible. Identification is
always impossible when voting machines are employed. There is a
trade-off between preserving the secret ballot which helps ensure free-
dom from intimidation and marking the ballot in order to provide
information to reviewing authorities. No one should be denied the right
to vote at the polling place. An equitable solution would simply be to
isolate the challenged ballot in case an adverse finding of legality is
reversed by some later action. One solution might be to number each
ballot and correlate that number to the voter by the poll book. Never-
theless, the objections to such an infringement on rights of privacy seem
to outweigh the advantages of swift and accurate resolution of contest
proceedings.
The remedies presently available to an election contestant are
somewhat limited. Whether a contest is heard by the elections boards
or by an independent administrative law judge, any showing of irregu-
larity should be enough to obtain at least a recount in the affected
precincts. 127 If from the recount or other evidence it is shown that the
results of the election are uncertain, then the remedy must be a new
election. Only if results indicate conclusively that someone else is the
winner should a court, administrative law judge or elections board
declare someone other than the originally certified winner elected. There
are strong arguments that the elections board should never be able to
reverse its canvassing decision once it is completed. 8 This is a harsh
but necessary restraint on the power of the administrative body to
change declared results.
The timing of available relief is also important. The elections
boards should have ample opportunity to canvass the election results
before any contest is adjudicated. However, if pre-election misfeasances
or election day irregularities are great enough to void the election, some
form of immediate injunctive relief is also desirable. An application to
an elections board with an immediate appeal to an administrative law
126. Id. § 163-152(a) (2), as amended by Law of May 10, 1977, ch. 345, § 2,
1977 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 116 (Pamphlet No. 7); see Overton v. Mayor of Hender-
sonville, 253 N.C. 306, 116 S.E.2d 808 (1960).
127. Strickland v. Hill, 253 N.C. 198, 116 S.E.2d 463 (1960).
128. See Britt v. Board of Canvassers, 172 N.C. 797, 90 S.E. 1005 (1916) (dic-
tum).
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judge is the best method for making such relief available. The burden
of showing irregularity sufficient to halt an election should be great and
the remedy used sparingly.
Judicial review of the actions of an administrative law judge or an
elections board should continue to be available only after exhaustion of
all administrative remedies. The courts should, to the extent possible,
stay out of the business of supervising the inherently political process of
electing public leaders (including judges).120 When the judiciary is
properly asked to intervene, proof of the impossibility of determining
who should be declared the winner of a disputed vote tally should be
sufficient to overturn an irregular vote count. Election results are
certainly entitled to a presumption of validity, but some recourse to the
courts remains necessary. Under the present system, any judicial con-
trol over the counting of votes is mainly illusory and an administrative
remedy is needed to fill the void.13 0 The courts should not opt out of the
arena when an arbitration role remains to be filled.
Finally, it is endemic that the most important factor in free and fair
elections is honest and impartial administrators operating in full public
view. Although any controls can be circumvented by a determined
force, a completely open process lessens the chance of subterfuge.
Citizen involvement in the electoral system must be encouraged and
adequate avenues for effective administrative and judicial control must
be provided. Legislative attempts to ensure the re-election of incum-
bents or to give one party an advantage over others must be struck down
swiftly and completely. Only with the depoliticalization of the electoral
process can the goal of an informed electorate making rational decisions
be fulfilled without built-in distortion from the electoral system.
GARY ROBERT CORRELL
129. For an example of direct political involvement, see In re Advisory Opinion,
232 N.C. 737, 61 S.E.2d 529 (1950).
130. Unless fraud exists the court looks at the action of the administrative body and
not at the mechanisms of the election. See Ponder v. Joslin, 262 N.C. 496, 138 S.E.2d
143 (1964). See also text accompanying note 53 supra.
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